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(Re)manufacturing consent in English





Unlike the use of force or coercion, the articulation of ideological discourse constitutes a softer approach in the legitimation and hegemonic rule of dominant political actors, achieved through manufacturing consent (Gramsci 1971). As a major site of ideology, the televised premier’s press conferences represent such a discursive event, enabling the Chinese government to convey its discursive formations or “regime of truth” (Foucault 1984) and in doing so to manufacture consent. Benefitting from a corpus containing 20 years of China’s Premier-Meets-the-Press conference data (1998–2017), this corpus-based critical discourse analysis (CDA) study explores the government-affiliated interpreters’ mediation and (re)construction of China’s discourse on PEOPLE. The interpreters are found to reinforce China’s discourse on PEOPLE (e.g. increased mentions of PEOPLE-related items) and (re)construct a more positive image of Beijing being people-oriented and concerned with its people in English (e.g., the repeated employment of “our people”). An examination of the collocational patterns relating to the item “people” (e.g., people’s, of/to/for/by*people) (re)presented in the English discourse sheds light on the government‒people ties in China. This article highlights the government interpreters’ vital agency role in image (re)construction and in contributing to the government’s political legitimation and hegemonic rule, particularly given the increasingly mediat(is)ed world we live in.





The interpreter-mediated Premier-Meets-the-Press conferences in China were gradually institutionalised and routinised from 1993 onwards, and started to be widely televised from 1998 (Yi 2016a). During these press conferences, the Chinese premier, the second most important official (ranked immediately after the president in China’s political hierarchy), answers a wide range of interesting and potentially sensitive questions from Chinese and international journalists. The topics covered include domestic issues such as China’s political and economic restructuring, anti-corruption campaigns, the Chinese people’s well-being, employment in China, Tibet, Hong Kong, as well as global issues such as the US election, the global financial crisis, China-Japan relations and the situation on the Korean Peninsula.​[1]​
Without a doubt, the high-profile press conferences featuring the Chinese premier constitute an authoritative source for the media and the general public to access China’s official policies and positions. A vital site of ideology and power, the press conferences also enable the Chinese government to convey its discursive formulations and ideological messages through the interpreter into the global lingua franca, that is, English. As such, rather than merely a derivative or inconsequential epiphenomenon (as suggested in many predominantly source-text-oriented approaches), the interpreted discourse into English is vitally important in its own right and represents in many ways China’s global voice. This is particularly the case when we take into account the high-profile nature of the televised event and the increasingly mediat(is)ed and (re)mediat(is)ed (Chouliaraki 2013; Gu 2018) world we live in (see Section 2 for more detailed discussion of the discursive significance of the English interpretation).
Cutting across the different topics addressed, a central and recurring theme of the press conferences concerns the government’s discourse on PEOPLE. Such discourse on PEOPLE either involves explicit discussions of people (e.g., meeting the people’s expectations and improving their well-being) or indirect discussions on related topics (e.g., economy and infrastructure construction) that include mentions of various PEOPLE-related concepts. PEOPLE constitutes an important yet essentially fuzzy concept subject to ideological (re)negotiation and value manipulation, thus representing a major “critical point” in translators and interpreters’ stance-taking and decision-making process (Munday 2012; Wang and Feng 2018). As such, a systematic investigation of how China’s discourse on PEOPLE is (re)presented and (re)constructed in English is of particular relevance, and can shed light on the interpreters’ agency and ideological positioning.
While these interpreter-mediated press conferences have increasingly garnered scholarly attention, studies so far have largely focused on norms (Wang 2012) and the various grammatical categories and linguistic features of the interpreters’ output, such as hedges (Pan and Zheng 2017) and modality (Fu 2016; Li and Hu 2013), without necessarily examining the ideological and discursive dimensions or taking an explicit critical discourse analytical (CDA) perspective.
The few CDA studies that have been carried out so far are largely qualitative in nature (Gu 2019a, 2019b), often without engaging sufficiently with the interpreters’ discursive (re)construction of the government’s actual propositional contents per se or mediation of a sustained discourse in a systematic manner. So far, only a few studies (Gu 2018; Wang and Feng 2018) have drawn on corpus-based CDA in investigating the ideological and discursive aspects of the interpreters’ mediation of the premier’s discourse. The former explores the interpreters’ strengthening and (re)presentation of Beijing’s discourse on its past accomplishments through using present perfect structures, while the latter focuses on the interpreters’ stance-taking through their treatment of the attitude-laden item 问题 (wenti), which might mean “question,” “issue” or “problem” depending on different contexts and situations. Notably, the interpreters’ potential agency role in weakening, maintaining or strengthening China’s official discourse and, consequently, effecting changes to the government’s hegemony and consensual rule intertextually between Chinese and English has rarely been explored.
To address this research gap, the present corpus-based CDA study aims to investigate the government-affiliated interpreters’ mediation of China’s discourse on PEOPLE to determine how hegemony and consensus is (re)mediated in English. With the overarching research question in mind, the more specific research questions to be addressed are: (1) To what extent and how is China’s discursive construction of the concept PEOPLE mediated by the interpreters? (2) What can an investigation of the collocations relating to the lexical item people reveal about the government-people ties in China, at least from a discursive perspective based on the corpus data? (3) From a product-oriented standpoint, what are the discursive effects of the interpreters’ possible mediation, for example, in (re)constructing a particular image and persona for the Chinese government, given the high-profile nature of the televised event and the increasingly mediat(is)ed and (re)mediat(is)ed world we live in?
The CDA analysis is carried out on the Chinese–English Political Discourses Corpus (CE–PolitDisCorp) established by the author (see Section 5 for more details). This corpus consists of 310,924 tokens in total and contains 20 years of the premier’s press conference data, spanning three consecutive government administrations (1998–2017). The CE–PolitDisCorp consists of different subcorpora. These include a Chinese subcorpus (Subcorpus A) containing data reflecting the Chinese premiers’ answers in Chinese, and a corresponding English subcorpus (Subcorpus B) containing data reflecting the interpreted discourse in English. In addition, there is Subcorpus C, which is the sum of Subcorpus A and Subcorpus B and is used to directly compare any identified patterns interlinguistically between the two languages. There is another subcorpus (Subcorpus D) containing bilingual data involving the domestic and international journalists’ questions in English or Chinese and their corresponding renditions by the interpreters into the other language (this subcorpus is not relevant and is thus not employed in the current study). The corpus-based CDA will be carried out both to establish how PEOPLE-related items are mediated at a lexical level overall and to explore the interpreters’ mediation and (re)construction of Beijing’s discourse in a more contextualised way at a collocational level. In addition, detailed CDA analysis is provided in the form of bilingual examples to highlight the interpreters’ ideological mediation. Essentially interdisciplinary in nature, this study promises to contribute to translation and interpreting studies, CDA, Chinese studies, the political sciences, and media and communication studies alike.

2. Interpreter-mediated political press conferences as an ideological site for manufacturing consent

Power can be exercised through coercion or consent. For Fairclough (1989), the manufacturing of consent is largely achieved through ideological discourse or “the ideological workings of language” (2). This constitutes “the prime means of manufacturing consent” (4). The surreptitious use of ideological language is closely related to the notion of ‘hegemony’ put forward by Italian neo-Marxist Antonio Gramsci. The Gramscian concept ‘hegemony’ (1971) often concerns consensus building and the control of ideas. That is, dominant ideas are not simply just enforced but often maintained via the manufacture of consent. Such consent is often manufactured by means of soft power entailing such ideological apparatuses as religious institutions (e.g., churches), educational institutions (e.g., schools) and the media (e.g., TV and radio). Hegemony, therefore, “subtly works through the management of the mind of the citizens, for example by persuasively constructing a consensus about the social order” (van Dijk 1998, 3).
Notably, focusing on the workings of contemporary news media in knowledge production and the manufacture of consent, Herman and Chomsky (1994) argue that the mass media often serve the interests of powerful groups such as governments, important international corporations and the ruling elites, thus leading to the further manipulation of the people and the marginalisation of the dissenting voices of the society. Within China’s sociopolitical context, scholars so far have examined, inter alia, school textbooks (Liu 2005) and China’s Higher Education sector (Gow 2012), media including China’s Spring Festival Gala (Wang 2012), as well as the Communist Party’s political ideologies enacted in the Chinese president’s discourse (Wang 2017) as ways and avenues of ideological inculcation, consensus building and political legitimation. 
However, little, if any, attention has been focused on the role of the seemingly neutral interpreters as potential manufacturers of consent for their institutional employer (the government interpreters are usually communist party members themselves and are recruited into the Chinese government’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs as civil servants). The high-profile press conferences constitute a vital site of ideology and power, enabling the Chinese government to articulate its discursive formulations through interpreting. This highlights the important role of the interpreters in conveying China’s official message to an international audience. Interestingly, the interpreter-mediated discourse in English is often taken as the officially sanctioned and, thus, necessarily correct version of the Chinese government’s voice. Given the increasingly (re)mediat(is)ed world we live in, the interpreters’ utterances are frequently (re)contextualised and even quoted verbatim by international media outlets (e.g., the BBC and CNN), on social media sites (e.g., Facebook, Twitter and Instagram) and on various official channels (e.g., government websites). As such, the discursive impact of the interpreted English discourse​[2]​ is significantly amplified in a way that goes beyond China’s national borders. This points towards the potential significance of the interpreter-mediated press conferences as a major site of consensus building, consent manufacturing and, as a result, political legitimation.

3. The Chinese government’s discourse on PEOPLE, legitimacy and hegemonic rule

Having argued that the interpreter-mediated political press conferences are an important site of manufacturing consent, the interconnected relationships between China’s discursive articulation of the concept PEOPLE, the government’s legitimacy, and hegemonic rule are explicated here. Notably, apart from such recurring topics as reform, economic development, Taiwan, Hong Kong and the government’s past achievements, a central theme of the premier’s press conferences concerns the government’s articulation of its discourse on PEOPLE. According to Zhang (2015, 51), the idea of 民生 (minsheng “people’s livelihood”) constitutes a key concept in Chinese politics that has had the potential to make or break the rule of emperors and leaders throughout China’s dynastic history all the way till now. That is, paying adequate attention to minsheng (“people’s livelihood”) contributes to the dynasty or government’s legitimacy. However, if the dynasty or government fails to adequately address the people’s needs and live up to the people’s expectations, it can lead to people’s “right to rebel” (ibid.).
This has been particularly the case in post-1978 China since the reform and opening-up initiated by Deng Xiaoping (in which the premier’s press conferences are firmly embedded). The Chinese government’s focus on PEOPLE is, in part, evidenced in the fact that there are 270 instances of 人民 (renmin, literally “people”) in the Chinese subcorpus (making it the 30th most frequent lexical item in the Chinese subcorpus) and 699 instances of “people” in the interpreted English subcorpus (making it the 22nd most frequent lexical item in the interpreted English subcorpus). Such repeated mentions of “people” at the press conferences may have considerable discursive significance. It reflects, at least discursively and rhetorically, the crucial importance of a people-oriented approach as a way to contribute to the government’s political legitimacy and hegemonic rule through constantly seeking consent from the Chinese people. This is particularly true, considering that hegemony is “never a once-for-all achievement” but one that is dynamic and unstable in nature and needs to be constantly maintained, renewed, recreated, renegotiated, reasserted and eventually re-won (Williams, in Eagleton 1991, 115). Having spelled out the close nexus between China’s official discourse on PEOPLE, the government’s discursive legitimisation, and hegemony, the corpus-based CDA approach adopted in this study is presented in the following section.
 
Corpus-based critical discourse analysis: A “useful methodological synergy”

This empirical study takes a corpus-based CDA approach in critically investigating the government-affiliated interpreters’ mediation and discursive (re)construction of China’s discourse on PEOPLE. The tradition of CDA conceptualises discourse as essentially a form of social practice that is both socially conditioned and socially constitutive (Fairclough and Wodak 1997). Such a conceptualisation implies a dialectical relationship between a particular discursive event (political press conferences, parliamentary debates, presidential addresses and government reports, etc.) and the institutions, structures and the broader sociopolitical and historical contexts framing it. CDA, which is predominantly qualitative in methodology, aims to problematise and make more apparent the hidden ideologies and opaque power relations embedded in discourse through close and critical examination of the data.
CDA, rather than a monolithic programme, is essentially heterogeneous and multifarious in nature, featuring Fairclough’s (1989) three-dimensional framework, van Dijk’s (1998) sociocognitive model, and Wodak’s (2001) discourse-historical approach, amongst others. However, despite the diversity, the different approaches within CDA are held together by a shared understanding of discourse as a social practice and the common take-nothing-for-granted attitude towards various social and political actors’ language use, particularly those in power. Thus far, typically qualitative CDA methods have been productively employed in investigating issues of power and ideology enacted in discourse in a wide range of settings, contexts and text genres.
However, despite the effectiveness of CDA, the approach is not without its critics. Often based on a relatively small amount of data, the traditionally qualitative CDA is sometimes criticised for being anecdotal and subjective in that researchers might randomly cherry-pick desirable information (Widdowson 1995) to suit their own ideological beliefs and agendas. This, therefore, calls into question the representativeness of the data and the validity of the qualitative manual analysis. For more objective and systematic analysis, methods of corpus linguistics (CL) have increasingly been incorporated into CDA analysis (see Hardt-Mautner 1995; Partington 2004), drawing on a sizeable amount of data containing naturally occurring language use. Combining the typically qualitative (CDA) and typically quantitative (CL), the methodological approach of corpus-based CDA can forge a “useful methodological synergy” (Baker et al. 2008), permitting researchers to explore a large amount of data and establish interesting and ideologically salient patterns in a more systematic manner that would not be possible to accomplish with the manual analysis of a small sample of text. This synergistic combination of CL and CDA can contribute to more convincing and robust findings.
So far, the corpus-based CDA approach has mostly been applied in examining monolingual texts. These studies include work on political discourse in China’s Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (Flowerdew 2004); educational policy discourse in the UK (Mulderrig 2012); and discursive representations of Islam (Baker 2010), refugees and asylum seekers (Baker et al. 2008) and masculinity (Baker and Levon 2015). However, the corpus-based CDA approach has not yet been widely applied in bilingual discourse analysis (e.g., studies of translation and interpreting).
In other words, while there have been a growing number of qualitative CDA studies which explore the hidden ideology and power embedded in translation (Hatim and Mason 1990; Kang 2007; Munday 2007; Zhang 2013) and interpreting (Beaton 2007; Beaton-Thome 2013), there have been only a few cases where the corpus-based approach has been applied. To the best of my knowledge, these corpus-based CDA studies relating to bilingual discursive communication (i.e., translation and interpreting) include Kim (2013, 2017), Li (2016), Gu (2018), and Wang and Feng (2018). Therefore, the present study represents a methodological step forward in this area by investigating the interpreters’ discursive mediation of the Chinese government’s discourse on PEOPLE using a corpus-based CDA approach.

CE–PolitDisCorp corpus data and procedures for data analysis

The analysis draws on the CE–PolitDisCorp (Chinese-English Political Discourses Corpus) compiled by the author to investigate various aspects of interpreting in political contexts in China, and China’s political discourses in both Chinese and English. The CE–PolitDisCorp consists of 20 years of China’s Premier-Meets-the-Press conference data (1998–2017). On average, one press conference lasts for approximately two hours. Since there is one press conference each year, there are, in total, 20 press conferences in the CE–PolitDisCorp, spanning the following three latest administrations: Jiang-Zhu (1998–2002), Hu-Wen (2003–2012) and Xi-Li (2013–2017). The diachronic nature of the corpus data makes it possible to identify consistent and relatively stable patternings over time as well as patternings specific to particular premiers’ and interpreters’ utterances.
The bilingual corpus contains 310,924 tokens in total (170,260 tokens in Chinese and 140,664 tokens in English). A more detailed breakdown of the various subcorpora in the CE–PolitDisCorp is shown in Table 1. Since the focus of this study is the ‘difference’ between the Chinese premiers’ utterances in Chinese and their corresponding interpretations into English, Subcorpus A and Subcorpus B are mainly used. Subcorpus C is the sum of Subcorpora A and B and is arranged exactly as the Chinese and English utterances naturally occur at the press conferences (sequentially Chinese ST and then English TT). Subcorpus C is, therefore, used to directly compare certain items or patterns between Chinese and English in order to identify any ideologically salient shifts. Subcorpus D is not used in this study.

-----------------------
Insert Table 1 here
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Table 1. Detailed breakdown of different subcorpora of the CE–PolitDisCorp
CE–PolitDisCorp (1998–2017)
Subcorpus A	Subcorpus B	Subcorpus C	Subcorpus D
Premiers’ discourse in Chinese	Premiers’ interpreted discourse in English	Premiers’ discourses in Chinese and English (sum of subcorpus A and B)	Journalists’ questions and their interpretations 
127,696 tokens	105,495 tokens	233,191 tokens	77,733 tokens


Transcripts of the premier’s press conferences are available on China’s government websites. However, the official transcripts have been extensively edited and, therefore, often do not accurately reflect the Chinese premiers’ and the government-affiliated interpreters’ precise utterances. The corpus data, as such, was transcribed verbatim from videos available on China’s official websites as well as on video-sharing sites such as YouTube and Youku. Given the “intrinsic evanescence” of spoken utterances (Shlesinger 1998, 4), these data collection and preparation processes were highly labour-intensive and time-consuming in nature.
After the data had been prepared and segmentation of the Chinese data had been carried out, the data was analysed using AntConc (3.4.4 windows), an open-access concordancing programme developed by Laurence Anthony at Waseda University. AntConc offers a wide range of functions including concordancing, wordlist generation (lexical frequency), keyword generation, Kwic sorting (to the left and right) and other useful tools. Also, the AntConc software is fully Unicode compliant, thus making it possible for researchers to work with a vast majority of languages (including Korean, Chinese and Japanese).
In terms of the specific procedures for analysis, a layered approach is adopted. That is, items relating to the broader concept of PEOPLE are first established in both subcorpora to permit an overall comparison between source texts (STs) and target texts (TTs) as to how PEOPLE-related lexical items are mediated by the interpreters at a macro-level. This is followed by more contextualised and collocational analysis using the most common PEOPLE-related item “people” (75% of all identified items in English) as a ‘way-in’ to explore the discursive construction of China’s official discourse on PEOPLE in English. This kind of collocational analysis beyond individual words is important. This is because, apart from individual words, discourse is also constructed through collocations or the ‘company’ (Firth 1957, 179) certain items keep. A word’s collocations are ‘statements of the habitual and customary places of that word’ (181). Collocations can be of significance either because they are frequently repeated or they are unexpected (Sinclair 1991). In this second stage of the collocational analysis, interesting and salient patterns are first identified in the English subcorpus, through sorting concordance lines to the left and right. The identified patterns are then compared with their Chinese STs in a retrospective manner in Subcorpus C to establish any shifts indicative of ideological mediation on the part of the interpreters.
This retrospective approach of comparison is adopted not only because it is in line with the overall target-oriented view of this study (seeing the interpreted English TT as important in its own right) but also because of the practical challenges in exploring and comparing the collocates of certain items in both languages simultaneously. In addition, while contemporary corpus linguistics has made it possible to use various statistical methods and tools to identify significant collocational patterns and to shed light on collocational strength, this paper chooses not to make use of these more sophisticated tools and methods. While these methods might be useful in establishing collocates in the Chinese and English subcorpora individually, it seems difficult to marry up the results systematically in both subcorpora and effectively compare the collocates in a meaningful way to highlight the interpreters’ ideological mediation. As such, the procedures adopted in this study serve to address the research questions in an effective, direct and streamlined manner.​[3]​
On a related methodological note, in corpus linguistics, the study of collocates is sometimes associated with the use of an external reference corpus to establish the strength of certain collocational patterns. Where possible and necessary, the interesting and ideologically salient collocations identified in the corpus data will be compared with data from the British National Corpus (BNC), which represents the general use of (British) English, and the Hansard corpus, which represents the more specialised use of political language taken from Britain’s parliamentary debates from 1803 to 2005. These serve to provide useful contrasting points to gauge the strength of certain identified collocational patterns and to lend further credence to my findings.




6. Data analysis: Interpreters’ (re)manufacture of consent in mediating China’s discourse on PEOPLE

In this section, the interpreters’ discursive mediation and (re)construction of China’s discourse on PEOPLE are approached at different levels. As an important starting point, PEOPLE-related items are first identified in both subcorpora using AntConc’s wordlist function and then explored at a macro level. A wide range of lexical items can be subsumed under the broader concept of PEOPLE. In terms of the selection criteria, the focus is not on just any nouns or lexical labels relating to the physical being of a person or specific occupational/professional groups (e.g., “farmers,” “employees,” “tourists,” “pupils,” “consumers” and “investors”). Instead, PEOPLE-related items in a philosophical, sociopolitical and legal sense (e.g., “people,” “individuals,” “citizens,” “the public,” “civilians”) are of more interest ideologically and are, thus, selected from the frequency lists generated in both subcorpora. The selection process involved close examination of various items in their respective contexts in both languages. The researcher’s discretion was used to decide upon the inclusion or exclusion of particular instances in the calculation of frequencies. For example, given the nature of the press conferences, the lexical item “people” refers mostly to the Chinese people as a collective. The few instances where “people” refers for example to the Indian people or Russian people are excluded. Similarly, the few instances where “people” refers to China’s ideological other in an accusatory or disapproving manner (e.g., “in my opinion, some people in the United States have made two mistakes”) are also excluded.
This overall analysis aiming to track the various PEOPLE-related labels at a lexical level is interesting because the very act of lexicalising is often far from being ideologically neutral. In articulating certain lexical items, the designations provided can be revealing in terms of the political stance and religious and ideological position an individual, group or institution takes. This labelling concerns, for example, whether the disputed islands between China and Japan should be lexicalised as 钓鱼岛 (“Diaoyu Islands”) or 尖閣諸島 (“the Senkaku Islands”) and, similarly, whether the disputed territory between the UK and Argentina should be rendered as the “Falkland Islands” or “Islas Malvinas.” Likewise, it is also ideologically salient whether one chooses to call the political entity currently in charge of Syria نظام الأسد (“the Assad regime”) or السورية الحكومة (“the Syrian government”) and whether the North Korean leader is a 독재자 (“dictator”) or alternatively a 偉大한領導者/無敵必勝의將軍 (“Great Leader/Invincible and Triumphant General”). Likewise, it is also salient for example whether the same historical event is lexicalised as الأندلس سقوط (Fall of Al-Andalus) or Reconquista. As such, the labelling or lexicalisation of certain items can constitute some of the critical points (Munday 2012) indicative of the stance and ideological positioning of the translators and interpreters in question.

With this in mind, the identified items and their frequencies are listed in Table 2.
-----------------------
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Table 2. PEOPLE-related lexical items identified in both subcorpora

PEOPLE-related items: Chinese ST	PEOPLE-related items: English TT
Item	Frequency (raw)	Item	Frequency (raw)
人民 (renmin “people”)	270 (38% of all items)	people 	699 (75% of all items)
大家 (dajia “big family”)	147	public	101




群体 (qunti “body of individuals”)	15	person	9
民众 (minzhong “the public”/“crowd of people”)	13	citizen(s)	7
老百姓 (laobaixing “old hundred surnames”)	11	mass(es)	7
公民 (gongmin “citizens”)	11	crowd	3
平民 (pingmin “civilians”)	7	civilians	2
公众 (gongzhong “the public”)	6	nationals	2
个人 (geren “individual”)	6	folks 	1
众 (zhong “crowd”)	6		
百姓 (baixing “hundred surnames”)	5		
个体 (geti “individuals”)	5		
万众 (wanzhong “a crowd of ten thousand”)	3		
大众 (dazhong “big crowd”)	1		
	708		938

With this as a useful point of departure, the interpreters’ overall mediation of the various PEOPLE-related items is discussed in Section 6.1. The interpreters’ gravitation towards the commonly used, neutral/positive and more central lexical item “people” (at the expense of items with unfavourable connotations and items that are more specialised and culture-specific in nature) is discussed in Section 6.2. Lastly, the collocational patterns relating to the specific item “people” in the English subcorpus are presented in Section 6.3.

6.1 Interpreters’ overall (re)construction of PEOPLE-related items

For a holistic idea of how the Chinese premiers’ discourse on PEOPLE is rendered in interpreting, the frequencies of eligible PEOPLE-related items in both subcorpora were calculated. While there are 708 instances of related items in Chinese, there are 938 instances in English (a 33% increase). On a normalised basis of 100,000 words, there are 554.4 instances of related items in Chinese and 889.1 instances in English (a 60% increase). As such, the lexical labels related to the broader concept of PEOPLE are significantly foregrounded in the English TT overall. 
Given the nature of the press conferences dealing predominantly with the Chinese people and Chinese public, the interpreters’ increased production of these items points to their institutional over-alignment with the government’s people-oriented approach. This represents a general strengthening of China’s discourse on PEOPLE. From the perspective of discursive effect, this (re)constructs an overall image that the Chinese government is more focused on the concerns and aspirations of its people in English. A more detailed account of the different scenarios of the interpreters’ increased production of PEOPLE-related items is provided in the following sections. This includes, for example, the interpreters’ repeated additions of the lexical item “people” untriggered by the Chinese ST (Section 6.2.1).

6.2 Interpreters’ gravitation towards and concentrated production of the lexical item “people”

Parallel to this overall trend of strengthening, there seems to be a shift towards lexical contraction (Beaton-Thome 2013). That is, there are in total 18 lexical items relating to PEOPLE in the Chinese ST, yet only 13 in the English TT, as a result of interpreting. This decrease in lexical variety co-occurs with and can be partially explained by the interpreters’ significantly increased and concentrated production of the specific lexical item “people” in English. There are 270 instances of 人民 in the Chinese ST (38% of all identified PEOPLE-related items in Chinese). On a normalised basis of 100,000 tokens, there are 211.4 instances in the ST. In the English TT, there are 699 instances of its equivalent “people” (75% of all identified PEOPLE-related items in English). On a normalised basis of 100,000 tokens, there are 662.6 instances in the English TT. Therefore, there is a marked 159% increase (or a 213% increase based on normalised frequency) as a result of interpreting.
This, as discussed later, is part of a tendency for the interpreters to opt for more common and core vocabulary (e.g., “people”) in the target language​[4]​ (at the expense of other more specialised and culture-specific items and items with negative connotations), thus discursively further strengthening and reinforcing the common and dominant concepts in the English TT. Given the prominence of “people” as the most common item and the intrinsic challenge of tracing the exact dynamics of shifts for all lexical items between languages, the lexical item “people” will be the focus of analysis in Section 6.2 and 6.3 at different levels. 
In terms of origin, while 人民 (renmin or “people”) can be traced back to ancient China, renmin in the more recent and modern sense of “people” was introduced into Chinese via Japanese during a wave of borrowings from Japanese-made Chinese or 和製漢語 (wasei kango). Those Japanese-made concepts were themselves mostly Japanese translations or readaptations of key Western concepts such as 民主 (“democracy”), 社會 (“society”), 科學 (“science”) and 實驗 (“experiment”) using Chinese characters. Since then the meanings of renmin (“people”) in the Chinese society have been fluid and subject to historical (re)definition and sociopolitical and ideological manipulation. That is, exactly who are the people (us) and who are not the people/the enemies (other) are often not set in stone but are ideological in nature and can be used as a tool for various political ends.
During the anti-Japanese war, for example, all social classes, strata and groups opposing the Japanese aggression were regarded as “the people.” The notion of “people” later became closely connected with class struggle as well as the socialist ideology in Chairman Mao Zedong’s era (1949–1976). For instance, in his speech entitled On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People, Mao (1957) stresses that within the “period of building socialism, the classes, strata and social groups which favour, support and work for the cause of socialist construction all come within the category of the people, while the social forces and groups which resist the socialist revolution and are hostile to or sabotage socialist construction are all enemies of the people.” Therefore, the Chinese population back then was effectively divided between the self (the people) and the enemies (non-people).
In stark contrast to Mao’s period, “people” has increasingly become an arguably more positive, general, inclusive and less class-oriented concept since the pragmatist reform and opening-up programme initiated by Deng Xiaoping in 1978 (in which the current press conferences are firmly embedded). As the general population grows increasingly richer, China’s middle class has expanded rapidly over the recent decades. The richer, more vocal and ever expanding middle class is demanding more from the government to meet their growing material, economic and cultural needs. The recent Chinese leaderships, therefore, are increasingly dependent upon performance-based legitimacy (Zhao 2009; Zhu 2011). Such performance-based legitimacy hinges upon the concrete things and tangible benefits the government can or at least promises to deliver to the Chinese people including the growing middle class (e.g., infrastructure construction, economic development, and improvement in people’s livelihoods).
Interestingly, from a diachronic perspective (Table 3), there is a clear tendency for the government-affiliated interpreters to progressively (re)produce the common and positive lexical item “people” across the three administrations (an 83% increase based on raw frequency and a 45% increase based on normalised frequency). This points to a more favourable image that the Chinese government is increasingly focused on its people’s interests and concerns at least rhetorically and discursively in Beijing’s global voice, that is, English.
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Table 3. Frequency of the item “people” by administration
Administrations	Frequency	Normalised frequency
Zhu (1998–2002)6101.6 tokens/year	121 (24.2 per year)	396.6 per 100,000 tokens
Wen (2003–2012)7166.3 tokens/year	357 (35.7 per year)	498.2 per 100,000 tokens
Li (2013–2017)7698.6 tokens/year	221 (44.2 per year)	574.1 per 100,000 tokens

As part of the general trend that the government increasingly seeks to appeal to the people (including China’s expanding middle class) for performance-based legitimacy as discussed above, the interpreters’ increasing production of “people” over the three periods can be explained and supported by the major milestones in the government’s official policies and ideals of people-oriented governance. These include the guiding “Three Represents” Thought (san ge dai biao si xiang) officially ratified in the year 2002 during the Jiang-Zhu administration, which states that the Communist Party of China (CPC) represents the development trends of China’s advanced productive forces, the orientation of China’s advanced culture and the fundamental interests of the overwhelming majority of the Chinese people.​[5]​ Similarly, “putting the people first” (yi ren wei ben) was put forward in the Hu-Wen administration, which, according to Xing (2009), represents an important part of the government’s legitimacy and consensus building through focusing on the people. More recently, in the Xi-Li administration, “Chinese dream” is greatly emphasised (Lavagnino 2017), which once again places people at the core of the government’s agenda (at least discursively).
As such, considering the sociopolitical context the premier’s press conferences are firmly embedded in, the interpreters’ repeated and increasing articulations of the item “people” in English have (re)constructed a more positive image in front of the international community that Beijing is increasingly people-oriented and well-positioned to satisfy its people’s needs and expectations. 
A systematic tracing of the interpreters’ use of the item “people” (re)presented in English identified the following scenarios. Out of the 699 instances of “people” in the English TT, there are 270 instances (38%) where “people” is triggered by corresponding item in the Chinese ST, 208 instances (30%) where “people” is untriggered by explicit markers in the ST but added in the TT, 144 instances (21%) where “people” is used to avoid items featuring negative connotations in English, and 77 instances (11%) where “people” is used to render items with specialised or culture-specific items. This clearly indicates the extent of the interpreters’ mediation. The latter three scenarios are discussed in more detail in the following sections.

6.2.1 Interpreters’ additions of “people” untriggered by explicit markers in the ST






Gloss: The government’s work has gone through four years. It told us that (we) must understand one truth...
TT: This government has been serving the people for four years. The four years of government work has taught me three things...
[2007]

Discursively, the explicit addition of “people” and the use of the present perfect continuous structure have (re)constructed an image that the government is the active servant of the people with great commitment and dedication.

6.2.2 Interpreters’ additions of “people” to avoid items with negative connotations in the TT

In addition to such general additions of “people” untriggered by the ST, the interpreters’ increased (re)production of “people” in the TT can be explained by the interpreters’ active ideological mediation to avoid items that carry negative connotations in English, hence an act of international audience accommodation (21% of all mentions of “people” in English).
This tendency to avoid mentioning items with potential negative connotations is, for example, evidenced noticeably in the interpreters’ treatment of 群众 (qunzhong or literally “the masses”). There are 91 mentions of 群众 in Chinese, whereas there are only 7 mentions of “mass(es)” in English. On the basis of 100,000 tokens, there are 71.2 and 6.6 mentions in Chinese and English respectively. The only few mentions of mass(es) are found in the treatment of fixed slogans/formulations. For instance, 大众创业, 万众创新 uttered in the 2015, 2016 and 2017 press conferences is interpreted literally as “mass entrepreneurship and innovation.” 
The word qunzhong has its sociopolitical and historical roots in the unique Chinese context. Extensively used in Mao’s communist revolution period, qunzhong (“the masses”) were represented positively and somewhat ideologically as a pivotal instrument of the ruling Communist Party and a historical force in revolutionising the society (Butsch and Livingstone 2014). The qunzhong, as opposed to lingdao (“leaders”) and the social elite, constituted the bulk of the populace (including the proletariat and peasants) and were seen as the vanguard and forces to be mobilised to actualise China’s communist revolutionary goals. This is exemplified in the expression qunzhong luxian (or “mass line”), which involved consulting the masses, interpreting their suggestions within the Marxism-Leninism framework, and enforcing the resulting policies.




Gloss: The Chinese government has the responsibility to guarantee the masses’ basic living conditions.





Gloss: I, firstly, want to thank the broad masses... They, through various avenues, offered me a lot of questions, advice and suggestions, making me very touched. 
TT: First of all, I would like to extend my deep thanks to our people... they have been putting to me a lot of questions, ideas and suggestions through various channels, which moved me greatly.
[2004]

Notably, both cases of qunzhong are (re)lexicalised as “our people.” Interestingly, the interpreters’ consistent option for the word “people” is often modified by the first-person plural “our.” The additions of “our” add an extra layer of active engagement to the premier’s discourse. This (re)creates an emphatic image that the government is the people’s government which acts in the interest of its people (see Section 6.3.1 for more details of the pattern).

6.2.3 Interpreters’ additions of “people” in place of items with specialised and culture-specific meanings





Gloss: In doing so, it can let our ‘streamlining administration and delegating powers’ help develop productivity and bring benefits to the laobaixing (ordinary folks). 
TT: We hope that throughout this process, we will further boost productivity, and bring more benefits to our people.
[2016]

Similarly, the interpreters’ tendency to avoid items with more specialised meanings is also evidenced in their interpretation of 公民 into English. 公民 (gongmin or literally “citizens”) represents specialised legal lexis indicative of people’s duties and rights. There are 11 mentions of 公民in Chinese, yet 7 mentions of “citizens” in English. On the basis of 100,000 words, the normalised numbers in Chinese and English are 8.6 and 6.6 respectively. 
This deficit can be explained by the interpreters’ tendency to replace gongmin “citizens” with the more general item “people” in their English interpretation. Such relative backgrounding and downplaying of the concept of CITIZENSHIP (indicating people’s duties and rights) in interpreting are salient and seemingly consistent with the observation that the “Chinese government is for the people, but not by the people” (Zhou 2012, 33). Further discussions of this point are provided in Section 6.3.
As such, to sum up, apart from the interpreters’ increased (re)production of PEOPLE-related items in the English TT overall (a 33% increase), China’s discourse on PEOPLE is also strengthened through the interpreters’ gravitation towards and concentrated production of the general and central item “people” in English, an item that possesses neutral/positive meanings and is arguably more entrenched in Western society and familiar to the target audience. This, as discussed above, is achieved at the expense of other relatively more peripheral items with specialised or culture-specific meanings (e.g., baixing/laobaixing) and items with unfavourable connotations (e.g., qunzhong) in the target language, that is, English. 
This trend forms part of a noticeable decrease in lexical variety, which constitutes a case of lexical contraction (Beaton-Thome 2013). Such lexical contraction often leads to relative “lexical stability” and “ideological reification” (391). That is, the fragmentary and diverse range of PEOPLE-related items in Chinese, as a result of interpreting, gravitates towards the more central and dominant lexical item “people.” Discursively, through foregrounding and gravitating towards the more common and predominant lexical item, the interpreters have stabilised and reinforced China’s ideological discourse and (re)constructed an image of the government being people-oriented in its governance emphatically and in a way that can be more easily received by the international audience.

6.3 The collocational patterns related to the item “people” 

Having discussed the lexical item “people” in more general terms, let us look more closely at the collocational patternings associated with “people” here. For more contextualised analysis regarding how China’s discourse on PEOPLE is (re)presented, the collocates of “people” are first examined in the English subcorpus through sorting to the left and right, which constitutes a direct and straightforward way of identifying patterns of immediate relevance. Given the limited space, only the most prominent patterns are discussed here. These include, to the left-hand side, “our people,” “of * people,” “to/for * people” and “by * people” and, to the right-hand side, “people’s.” Where relevant, in retrieving the eligible concordance lines, the wildcard function (*) was used to cover all instances belonging to the pattern in question.
6.3.1 “our people”

“Our people,” featuring the first-person plural pronoun, is identified as a recurrent and particularly strong pattern in English. Figure 1 shows the concordance lines featuring the pattern. “Our people” occurs 70 times in the English subcorpus (105,495 tokens in total). On a normalised basis of 100 million words, this would be 66,353.9 times. In comparison, in the British National Corpus (BNC), a 100-million-word text corpus, the pattern “our people” only appears 323 times. In other words, the pattern “our people” is used 205.4 times more frequently in the current English subcorpus than in the BNC. Similarly, the pattern “our people” appears 31,524 times in the 1.6-billion-word Hansard corpus, which documents political debates in the British parliament from 1803 to 2005. This is equivalent to 1,970.3 times on the basis of 100 million words. As such, the pattern “our people” is used approximately 33.7 times more frequently by the government interpreters in the English subcorpus than in the Hansard corpus.
To understand the extent to which the pattern is triggered by the Chinese ST, the 70 instances of “our people” are manually compared with their Chinese counterparts on a one-to-one basis in Subcorpus C. In 66 out of the 70 instances (94%), the pronoun “our” is not triggered by the ST but added by the interpreters in English. Such additions constitute a case of repetition, which can be viewed as an additional effort on the part of the interpreters to engage with the global audience on Beijing’s discursive articulation.

-----------------------
Insert Figure 1 here
-----------------------

Figure 1. Screenshot of concordance lines featuring pattern “our people”

Discursively, this (re)creates and strikes home a more positive image of the government being the dedicated servant of the people internationally. Notably, apart from such an affectionate people-oriented image, it also implies a sense that the government occupies a hegemonic leadership position ‘above’ to rule the people. That is, the repeated use of “our people” seemingly makes the ordinary Chinese people further “interpellated” or “recruited” (Althusser 1971, 174) into a passive subject position, perhaps unknowingly, in the English discourse. As such, cumulatively, through such consensus building and the manufacture of consent (Gramsci 1971), the interpreters have contributed to the government’s hegemonic rule and legitimacy.

From a diachronic perspective, the interpreters’ 66 additions of “our” in English are investigated across the three administrations. As Table 4 shows, over the three periods, the interpreters have played an increasingly active mediation role through the additions of “our” (a 4,000% increase from 0.2 to 8.2 instances per year based on raw frequency or a 3,147% increase based on normalised frequency over the administrations). Notably, the interpreters’ additions of “our” are concentrated in Premier Li’s administration so far (2013-2017), the most recent of the three administrations covered (only 5 press conferences but 62% of all additions).
-----------------------
Insert Table 4 here
-----------------------

Table 4. Frequency of “our” added across the administrations
Administration	Frequency of additions	Normalised frequency of additions
Zhu (1998–2002)6101.6 tokens/year	1 (0.2 per year)	3.28 per 100,000 tokens
Wen (2003–2012)7166.3 tokens/year	24 (2.4 per year)	33.49 per 100,000 tokens















Gloss: I and my colleagues are willing to accept people’s supervision, because in my mind, there are the masses’ happy smiles ... I think our government must forge ahead, be unswerving and unafraid of difficulty and danger in devoting our complete energy and hot blood for the people’s interests.





Gloss: I said (I) will declare war against pollution like smog. This is because this is a focal issue that the society focuses on. Many people wake up in the morning and check this PM2.5 index as soon as they turn on their mobile phones. This has already become a major livelihood problem.





Gloss: What is the aim of our administration? The departure point is to improve livelihood, that is, to let the masses’ wishes and demands for livelihood force our development and push forward and test our reform.
TT: All the government’s work is to improve the well-being of our people. So we need to use the concrete wishes for a better life by our people to drive our development and reform and test the results of our reform.
[2016]

The interpreters’ repeated use of “our people” serves to make the original Chinese discourse more affectionate and engaging. This, discursively and rhetorically, helps foster a closer affinity between the government and people, (re)constructing an image of the Chinese government being the people’s government. The ideologically salient additions are also indicative of the nature of the government-people nexus. Discursively, it constitutes a (re)affirmation of the reality that the Chinese people are under the direct governance of and are reliant on the CPC-led government. The interpreters’ such mediation cumulatively leads to a stronger level of the ruling government’s hegemony. In our increasingly mediat(is)ed and (re)mediat(is)ed world (Chouliaraki 2013; Gu 2018), such interpreter-mediated discourse often gains further international currency and can carry global ramifications when the English interpretation is quoted by media outlets, appears in government websites and is taken for granted as Beijing’s global voice. Figures 2 and 3 illustrate how the interpreter-mediated discourse featuring the repeated additions of “our people” (evidenced in Example (6)) is (re)mediated as an official record in English on the website of the Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC) and on the website of China’s consulate-general in San Francisco.
-----------------------
Insert Figure 2 here
-----------------------




Insert Figure 3 here
-----------------------

Figure 3. Screenshot of interpreter’s additions of ‘our people’ appearing on the website of China's consulate general in San Francisco (http://sanfrancisco.china-consulate.org/eng/zgxw/t1137475.htm (​http:​/​​/​sanfrancisco.china-consulate.org​/​eng​/​zgxw​/​t1137475.htm​))

6.3.2 “of * people”

There are in total 127 instances of “of * people” in the English subcorpus, including “of people” (35 instances), “of the people” (48 instances), and “of our people” (26 instances). The collocates of this structure were examined on both sides. No particularly interesting pattern was identified on its right. On its left, interesting collocates were identified and regrouped based on semantic meaning, as shown in Table 5.
-----------------------
Insert Table 5 here
-----------------------
Table 5. The collocates associated with “of * people”

Life, livelihood and well-being	well-being (3); lives (3); livelihood(s) (3); living standards (2); working and living conditions (1); livelihood and the safety (1)	of (the/our) people
Needs, will, wishes, interests, benefits, concerns, expectations and satisfaction	interest(s) (16); will (5); expectation(s) (3); concern(s) (2); increasing material and cultural needs (2); pride (1); dreams (1); common wish (1); common aspiration (1); rights and interests (1); convenience (1); feelings (1); dignity (1); basic necessities (1); employment (1); special needs (1); pockets (1)	
Requirements on the people (e.g., qualities and proactive involvement)	supervision (4); entrepreneurship (2); enthusiasm and creativity (2); hard work (2); full involvement (1); efforts (1); creativity and entrepreneurial enthusiasm (1); wisdom and ability (1); competence (1); initiative and creativity (1); trust (1); wisdom (1); joint efforts (1); independent thinking (1); understanding (1); views (1)	
Miscellaneous rights	freedom(s) and rights (2); rights (1); freedom, property and safety (1); welfare (1); legal private assets (1); life and property (1)	
Other related collocates	minds (4); improvement (3); hearts (3); smiles (2); representatives (1); government (1); service (1); hearts and minds (1); happy and smiling faces (1)	

The collocates (nouns) to the left of “of * people” feature a list of items which are on the government’s agenda. In other words, China’s discourse on PEOPLE revolves around such areas as people’s well-being and livelihood, realisation of people’s dreams and fulfilment of people’s expectations. Notably, it is explicitly mentioned in the 2006 press conference that “our government is a government of the people.” As such, the people are portrayed to be highly dependent on the government to have their livelihood needs, interests, expectations, concerns and various rights fulfilled and met. 
In contrast, the people’s contributions in return are mostly entrepreneurship, enthusiasm, and creativity, which seem to be relatively vague formulations and are mostly restricted to the non-political sphere (e.g., economy and business). Notably, the only area related to the political arena is the role of people in supervising the government that is already elected and in place. Comparative analysis shows that these collocates are largely accurate reflections of the Chinese ST.

6.3.3 “to/for * people”

Attention is now focused on “to/for * people” in the data. Regarding the concordance lines featuring “to * people” (Figure 4), “benefit(s),” for example, is a frequent collocate to the left of the structure under investigation, along with other lexical items such as “service(s)” and “devote.” This indirectly constructs an image of the government being the benefactor and servant to the Chinese people (the government is in a position to, for example, “deliver”, “bring”, “achieve”, “give”, “provide” and “devote”). The ordinary people, in comparison, are (re)presented to be in a passive and recipient position and need to, for example, rely on the government to provide services and bring benefits to them. Even in cases where people’s agency is needed (e.g., “people’s call,” “people’s independent thinking”), the government is still in a position to “respond” to people’s call and “give full play” to people’s independent thinking.
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Regarding the concordance lines featuring “for * people” (Figure 5), the structure is collocated with strong action verbs such as “create,” “provide,” “eliminate,” “pave,” “bring,” “achieve,” “promote,” “make,” and “ensure” to the left. Once again, the government is (re)presented as the chief social actor and benefactor acting in the best interests of the people (who, for example, “provides” adequate housing, “creates” an enabling environment, “raises” the living standards, “provides” new jobs and “brings out” initiative for the people).

-----------------------








To sum up, an examination of the concordance lines featuring “to/for * people” in English shows that the Chinese government is (re)presented as the benefactor and servant to the Chinese people. In contrast, the people are portrayed to be in a passive position as recipients of the government’s actions. Comparative analysis suggests that these are more or less accurate renditions of the Chinese original.

6.3.4 “by * people”

In this section, attention is focused on “by * people,” which can shed light on the level of initiative and the active role played by the ordinary people as (re)presented in the interpreted discourse. A close examination of the concordance lines featuring “by * people” (Figure 6) shows that there is a particularly frequent pattern relating to people’s monitoring, supervision and oversight over the government (6th, 9th, 11th, 12th lines). However, the people’s agency is seemingly restricted to commenting or asking questions, for instance, on the Internet (2nd, 5th, 10th lines). Other concordance lines include people’s wishes (7th line) as well as the generic and vague articulation that “history is created by people and written by the people” (1st and 15th lines) yet without mentioning how. That is, there is a lack of mentions in terms of, for example, whether the leadership is directly elected by the people in a Western sense or otherwise. Instead, the power of the government is simply “bestowed” by the people (13th line), seemingly articulated in a vague manner.
-----------------------
Insert Figure 6 here
-----------------------

Figure 6. Screenshot of concordance lines featuring pattern “by * people”





Another frequent pattern identified is “people’s.” The possessive form is potentially revealing in terms of what specific aspects of the ordinary people form the focus of the government’s attention and agenda. In total, there are 116 instances of “people’s” in the English subcorpus. Further sorting to the right retrieves the following collocates, which are categorised semantically and presented in Table 6.
-----------------------
Insert Table 6 here
-----------------------
Table 6. Collocates associated with “people’s”

People’s	People’s well-being, livelihood needs and rights	lives (10); livelihood (8); (basic) health care/housing/living/growing cultural needs (8); well-being (7); income (5); welfare (1); quality of life and health (1); subsistence right (1); medical care (1); life (1); living standards (1); housing demand (1)
	People’s expectations, wishes and interests	expectations (3); interest(s) (2); wish (1); grievances (1); satisfaction (1); minds (1); call (1)
	Requirements on the people’s proactive involvement	understanding (2); ability (1); awareness (1); effectiveness (1), enterprising spirit (1); enthusiasm (1); role (1); support (1); trust (1); initiative (1); hard work (1); independent thinking and creativity (1)
	Other collocates	government (2); money (1); power (1)

A close examination of the collocates to the right of “people’s” shows that the government pays great attention to people’s livelihood and various needs and bears the people’s interests and expectations in mind. At the same time, the people’s proactive involvement is required, which seems to be restricted to their initiative, hard work, independent thinking and creativity. Therefore, similar to the previous discussion, explicit mentions of people’s agency or participation of any kind in China’s political arena are conspicuously absent. Notably, there are repeated articulations that the Chinese government is essentially the people’s government. Comparative analysis between the ST and TT shows that the propositional content is largely triggered by the Chinese original. In other words, we can observe a general maintenance of the discursive message in English.




Aiming to deconstruct and unpack the hidden ideologies embedded in the interpreted English discourse and shed light on interpreter agency, this article has focused on the press conference interpreters’ (re)presentation of the Chinese government’s discourse on PEOPLE and discursive (re)construction of the government’s image in English at different levels. To address a major criticism levelled at the traditional and predominantly qualitative CDA, corpus-based CDA was carried out for more objective and systematic analysis. 
The choice made in lexicalising a “certain entity is not neutral but is a means of allocating it a certain value” (Beaton-Thome 2013, 393–394). Through the proliferated (re)production of PEOPLE-related items in general terms and, more specifically, gravitating towards the lexical item “people,” the interpreters have strengthened China’s discourse on PEOPLE. Discursively, this further (re)constructs a more favourable image that the government is people-oriented, thus leading to an added degree of performance-based legitimacy overall for Beijing in English. 
More contextualised analysis focusing on the patternings of “people” establishes the interpreters’ tendency to use “our people” as a particularly strong recurrent pattern untriggered by the Chinese ST. The repeated articulations of “our people” constitute an interesting site of hegemonic consensus building. This seemingly represents the interpreters’ attempt to further appeal to the people and seek people’s consent and support, which constitutes an additional effort of positive engagement. Further attention on “of/to/for/by * people” and “people’s” (re)presented in English reveals a list of collocates. The collocates examined are indicative of the government-people ties in China, providing interesting textual and discursive evidence for the observation that the Chinese government is generally “for the people, but not by the people” (Zhou 2012, 33), that is, compared with Western democracies.
As such, as demonstrated previously, the government interpreters’ discursive mediation (realised in various discursive means and strategies) leads to further naturalising and naturalising of Beijing’s discourse on PEOPLE, based on the distinction made by Wang (2017, 425). In other words, the interpreters have, on the one hand, served to naturalise and further (re)present an image that Beijing is by nature the people’s government and, on the other hand, worked to naturalise, manufacture consent and render unchallenged the government’s consensual and hegemonic rule (Gramsci 1971) in a seemingly natural and taken-for-granted fashion. This is of particular significance, given that China is increasingly “moving away from totalitarianism towards hegemonic rule” (Zhang 2011, 21). The discursive effects and ramifications of the interpreters’ mediation and image (re)creation are often further amplified in our increasingly mediat(is)ed and (re)mediat(is)ed world (Gu 2018, 2019a), where the interpreter-mediated discourse in English is routinely (re)contextualised and quoted verbatim by media outlets and various official sources. From this perspective, the interpreter-mediated discourse ultimately constitutes a vital source and important starting point of international news and global knowledge production.
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^1	  At these press conferences, the journalists’ questions are pre-vetted and “preselected” backstage (Yi 2016b, 5474). Also, domestic journalists in China are found to habitually ask relatively easy ‘softball’ questions, whereas international journalists tend to pose more critical, challenging and face-threatening questions (Du and Rendle-Short 2016; Gu 2019a).
^2	  Notably, the target audience of the official interpreted English discourse includes, inter alia, the international audience (e.g., foreign journalists and the general public around the world), overseas Chinese, and the social elites in China (e.g., the well-educated middle class and English-speaking university students). The broad nature of the target audience highlights the potential importance of the interpretation in English as a crucial discourse in its own right. 
^3	  Indeed, the collocates identified this way (e.g., sorting to the left and right) constitute a subset of and very much overlap with the collocates yielded from more sophisticated approaches.
^4	  A similar trend can be found for “public”, the second most common item in the English subcorpus. There are 26 instances of lexical items in Chinese directly related to “public” (民众13; 公众 6; 众6; 大众1) yet 101 instances of “public” in English. This reflects a convergence towards the general and more neutral item “public” in interpretation.
^5	  Notably, the third “represent” in the “Three Represents” theory signals a noticeable shift from the Communist party’s previous focus on the proletarian workers and peasants (e.g., in Mao’s era) to one that is more inclusive, hence a broadening of the government’s “mass base” (Shambaugh 2016, 35). Such a (re)definition of “people” suggests that the party at least discursively represents the fundamental interests of the overwhelming majority of the Chinese people, including even the private sector entrepreneurs and capitalists who were once despised and denied CPC membership. 
